期刊
ECONOMIC THEORY
卷 32, 期 2, 页码 251-286出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7
关键词
evolution of preferences; evolutionary stability; overconfidence; interdependent preferences
类别
This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.
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