期刊
PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
卷 383, 期 2, 页码 631-642出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2007.05.056
关键词
evolutionary snowdrift game; cooperative behavior; additional strategy
The effects of an additional strategy or character in the evolutionary snowdrift game (SG) are studied in a well-mixed population or fully connected network and in a square lattice. The SG, which is a possible alternative to the prisoner's dilemma game in studying cooperative phenomena in competing populations, consists of two types of strategies, C (cooperators) and D (defectors). The additional L-strategy amounts to a strongly persuasive character that a fixed payoff is given to each player when a L-player is involved, regardless of the character of the opponent. In a fully connected network, it is found that either C lives with D or the L-players take over the whole population. In a square lattice, three possible situations are found: a uniform C-population, C lives with D, and the coexistence of all three characters. The presence of L-players is found to enhance cooperation in a square lattice by enhancing the payoff of cooperators. The results are discussed in terms of the effects in restricting a player to compete only with his nearest neighbors in a square lattice, as opposed to competing with all players in a fully connected network. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据