4.3 Article

Micro-aspects of monetary policy: Lender of Last Resort and selection of banks in pre-war Japan

期刊

EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
卷 44, 期 4, 页码 657-679

出版社

ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2006.11.002

关键词

Lender of Last Resort; Central bank; monetary policy; financial crisis; bank; Japan

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This paper explores how the Bank of Japan (BOJ) dealt with the trade-off between stability of the financial system and the moral hazard of banks in pre-war Japan. The BOJ concentrated Lender of Last Resort (LLR) loans with those banks that had an established transaction relationship with the BOJ. At the same time, the BOJ carefully selected its transaction counterparts, and did not hesitate to end the relationship if the performance of a counterpart declined. Further, the BOJ was selective in providing LLR loans. Through this policy, the BOJ could avoid the moral hazard that the LLR policy might otherwise have incurred. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.3
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据