期刊
ECONOMIC THEORY
卷 33, 期 1, 页码 169-182出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3
关键词
leading-by-example; voluntary provision; public goods; signaling; reciprocity
类别
We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188-1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87:627-657, 2003). In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据