期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
卷 137, 期 1, 页码 153-185出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007
关键词
extreme point; faces; non-linear pricing; monopoly pricing; multidimensional screening; incentive compatibility; adverse selection; mechanism design
类别
The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points, and faces of the feasible set. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. We characterize the mechanisms that maximize revenue for some well-behaved distribution of buyer's valuations. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据