Bilateral monopoly, identical distributors, and game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels

Game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels have generated six widely held beliefs (we call them Channel Hypotheses) whose universal soundness has not been examined. To assess the validity of these Hypotheses, we develop a general, linear-demand model in which distributors face heterogeneity in demand, heterogeneity in costs, and any degree of intensity of inter-distributor competition. For ease of comparison, we nest the bilateral-monopoly model and the identical-distributors model within our general model. Our analysis reveals that the Channel Hypotheses do not generalize beyond the specific game-theoretic models from which they were derived. This lack of generality is critical, because these beliefs have led to intuitively appealing (but inadvertently misleading) strategic advice for managers and modeling advice for game theorists. From our general, linear-demand model, we derive six Channel Propositions that correct these accumulated errors of conceptualization and that generate a richer, more broadly applicable set of managerial and modeling implications. We also present a Channel-Modeling Proposition that we believe will help modelers avoid the errors of conceptualization described in this paper.