期刊
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
卷 21, 期 4, 页码 445-470出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11408-007-0062-6
关键词
Relationship lending; Asymmetric information; Financial distress; Hold-up; Coordination failure
Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm's-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank's fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits, the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank's information precision. For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.
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