期刊
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES
卷 7, 期 1, 页码 85-97出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9065-z
关键词
Phenomenology; Moral phenomenology; Emotions; Fittingness; Demands; Approval; Harm
类别
In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible with some uses of moral phenomenology for moral epistemology and with the objectivity and justifiability of parts of morality.
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