期刊
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION
卷 17, 期 1, 页码 136-144出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.12.004
关键词
action; intention; action effects; time judgment; awareness; agency
资金
- Economic and Social Research Council [RES-000-23-1571] Funding Source: researchfish
- ESRC [RES-000-23-1571] Funding Source: UKRI
This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential sense-making process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role. When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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