4.4 Article

On the stability of Cournot equilibrium when the number of competitors increases

期刊

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
卷 66, 期 3-4, 页码 445-456

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ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.010

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Cournot oligopoly; capacity limits; stability

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This article reconsiders whether the Cournot equilibrium really becomes a perfect competition equilibrium when the number of competitors goes to infinity. It has been questioned whether the equilibrium remains stable with an increasing number of firms. Contraindications were given for linear and for isoelastic demand functions. However, marginal costs were then taken as constant, which means adding more potentially infinite-sized firms. As we want to compare cases with few large firms to cases with many small firms, the model is tuned so as to incorporate capacity limits, decreasing with an increasing number of firms. Then destabilization is avoided. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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