期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
卷 66, 期 3-4, 页码 597-605出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.08.002
关键词
ultimatum game; minimum acceptable offer; personality
类别
In a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment, responder behavior is more consistent with game-theoretic predictions when responders indicate a binding minimum acceptable offer (MAO) or when rejection penalizes a hostage third player. In general, female subjects indicated higher MAOs but had a much greater reaction than males to the presence of a third player. Offers increase in the presence of a binding MAO but are not affected by a third player. Behavior in our experiment is also generally consistent with hypotheses based on a popular personality test instrument. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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