期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 63, 期 2, 页码 642-662出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.015
关键词
Nash equilibrium; computer science; algorithms
类别
We present two simple search methods for computing a sample Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game: one for 2-player games and one for n-player games. Both algorithms bias the search towards supports that are small and balanced, and employ a backtracking procedure to efficiently explore these supports. Making use of a new comprehensive testbed, we test these algorithms on many classes of games, and show that they perform well against the state of the art-the Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-player games, and Simplicial Subdivision and Govindan-Wilson for n-player games. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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