期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 64, 期 2, 页码 548-564出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.001
关键词
Terrorism; Terror capacity; Threat; Conflict; Two periods; Dynamics; Growth; Discounting; Defense inefficiency; Attack inefficiency; Contest success function; Time substitution
类别
A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint. the terrorist's total outcome is positive. With equal attack and defense inefficiencies, when the terrorist as defender requires his first period outcome to be positive, the attacker eliminates the asset ill the first period when asset growth multiplied with the Square roots of the terrorist's and attacker's discount parameters exceed 4/root 3. This gives maximum conflict in the first period. Growth and the two discount parameters are strategic complements. The range for the attack inefficiency divided by defense inefficiency, which Causes negative first period outcome for the terrorist, increases with asset growth. The attacker refrains from asset elimination in the first period due to strength (weakness) if the ratio is below (above) the range. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据