期刊
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS
卷 30, 期 4, 页码 509-526出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2008.05.001
关键词
Moral hazard; Moral motivation; Teamwork; Corporate social responsibility; Voluntary abatement
Corporate social responsibility can improve firms' ability to recruit highly motivated employees. This can secure socially responsible firms' survival even in a highly competitive environment. We show that if both socially responsible (green) and non-responsible (brown) firms exist in equilibrium, workers with high moral motivation, who shirk less than others, will self-select into the green firms. If unobservable effort is sufficiently important for firm productivity, this can drive every brown firm out of business-even in the case where many workers have no moral motivation whatsoever. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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