期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 141, 期 3, 页码 281-297出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9160-6
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In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts. The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are human atoms co-located with human organisms. It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances, this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can do.
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