期刊
ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE
卷 12, 期 1, 页码 77-96出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10677-008-9136-4
关键词
Meta-ethics; Moral judgment; Automatic processing; Moral intuitions; Moral agency; Reason-responding; Reason-tracking
类别
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814-834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt's research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no 'real' moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
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