期刊
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
卷 92, 期 3, 页码 776-788出版社
OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aap042
关键词
adverse selection; product safety; noisy signals; credence goods; climate forecast
资金
- Center for Research on Environmental Decisions under National Science Foundation [SES-0345840]
We analyze how to induce sellers to disclose food safety With repeated interactions and safety correlated over time, cash transfers alone do not ensure disclosure Perfect. but costly, testing ensures disclosure with a complex lottery that may be difficult to Implement in practice In contrast, even a noisy quality forecast allows the buyer to induce perfect disclosure with a simple pricing scheme Forecast introduction may benefit or harm sellers. After introduction, sellers may suffer from increases in forecast precision As an illustration, we cast our model in the context of Rift Valley fever in an East African livestock market
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