期刊
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
卷 11, 期 3, 页码 347-367出版社
WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002352
关键词
Coalition formation; stable partition; merges and splits
资金
- GLoRiClass fellowship - European Commission (Early Stage Research Training Mono-Host Fellowship) [MESTCT-2005-020841]
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TUgames, hedonic games and exchange economy games.
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