期刊
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE
卷 33, 期 11, 页码 2093-2101出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.05.003
关键词
Payout policy; Corporate governance; Agency problems; External financing constraints
资金
- National Research Foundation of Korea [전06A1302] Funding Source: Korea Institute of Science & Technology Information (KISTI), National Science & Technology Information Service (NTIS)
This paper analyzes the effect of corporate governance on the payout policy when a firm has both agency problems and external financing constraints. We empirically test whether strong corporate governance would lead to higher payout to minimize agency problems (outcome hypothesis), or to lower payout to avoid costly external financing (substitute hypothesis). We find that firms with higher (lower) external financing constraints tend to decrease (increase) payout ratio with an improvement in their corporate governance. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that the relation between payout and corporate governance is reversed depending on the relative sizes of agency and external financing costs. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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