期刊
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
卷 53, 期 1, 页码 69-89出版社
ACAD MANAGEMENT
DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.48036975
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In this study, we view the contracts of top managers from an integrated agency theory-trust perspective, arguing that two conditions reflecting CEO risk bearing, top management team (TMT) behavioral uncertainty and CEO vulnerability, are negatively related to a CEO's perceptions of TMT benevolence toward him-/herself, which in turn influence the protective features of TMT contracts. Model tests on data from 122 family-owned firms in Spain support our hypotheses overall. Agency theory may be enhanced by accounting for a CEO's perceptions (as principal) of TMT benevolence and for the effect of those perceptions on contracts with TMT members (as agents).
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