期刊
MARKETING SCIENCE
卷 29, 期 2, 页码 315-335出版社
INFORMS
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1090.0500
关键词
observational learning; learning models; informational cascades; herding; quality inference; Bayes' rule; dynamic programming; kidney allocation
类别
Mere observation of others' choices can be informative about product quality. This paper develops an individual-level dynamic model of observational learning and applies it to a novel data set from the U. S. kidney market, where transplant candidates on a waiting list sequentially decide whether to accept a kidney offer. We find strong evidence of observational learning: patients draw negative quality inferences from earlier refusals in the queue, thus becoming more inclined towards refusal themselves. This self-reinforcing chain of inferences leads to poor kidney utilization despite the continual shortage in kidney supply. Counterfactual policy simulations show that patients would have made more efficient use of kidneys had the concerns behind earlier refusals been shared. This study yields a set of marketing implications. In particular, we show that observational learning and information sharing shape consumer choices in markedly different ways. Optimal marketing strategies should take into account how consumers learn from others.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据