期刊
ECONOMICS LETTERS
卷 107, 期 2, 页码 201-204出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.024
关键词
Executive compensation; Fraud; Incentives; Product market competition
类别
The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm's stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders' trade-off between inducing effort and fraud. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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