期刊
THEORY AND DECISION
卷 69, 期 1, 页码 97-118出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-008-9118-y
关键词
Information aggregation; Committee decisions; Preference heterogeneity
This paper is concerned with the efficiency of information aggregation in a committee whose members have heterogeneous preferences over a binary decision variable. We study a voting game with a pre-vote communication stage and identify conditions under which full information aggregation is possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each committee member is endowed with information, full information aggregation is possible despite preference heterogeneity.
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