期刊
AUTISM
卷 14, 期 5, 页码 474-494出版社
SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
DOI: 10.1177/1362361310366314
关键词
autism; physical self-awareness; psychological self-awareness; simulation theory; theory of own mind
资金
- ESRC [ES/F016638/1] Funding Source: UKRI
- Economic and Social Research Council [ES/F016638/1] Funding Source: researchfish
Assuming that self-awareness is not a unitary phenomenon, and that one can be aware of different aspects of self at any one time, it follows that selective impairments in self-awareness can occur. This article explores the idea that autism involves a particular deficit in awareness of the 'psychological self', or 'theory of own mind'. This hypothesised deficit renders individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) at least as impaired at recognising their own mental states as at recognising mental states in other people. This deficit, it is argued, stands in contrast to an apparently typical awareness of the 'physical self' amongst people with autism. Theoretical implications of the empirical evidence are discussed.
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