期刊
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION
卷 19, 期 3, 页码 751-761出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.07.003
关键词
Introspection; Self-awareness; Inner self; Semantic compositionality; Phenomenal transparency; Mental quotation; Extrospection; Inner speech; Phonology; Descartes
What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of It is possible? The paper asks if Descartes's idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought In the former case self-awareness turns out empty if experience is transparent In the latter, it can best be conceived of as a form of mental quotation Various proposed analyses of direct and indirect quotation are discussed and tested regarding their applicability to thought It is concluded that, on the assumption of compositionality, the inner self is only insofar accessible to awareness as it has an accessible phonological (or otherwise subsymbolic) structure. as apparently only inner speech does (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc All rights reserved
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