期刊
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
卷 91, 期 4, 页码 531-553出版社
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x
关键词
-
类别
People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as 'in-between' cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right to say that the person lacks the belief.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据