期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
卷 20, 期 1, 页码 195-224出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00287.x
关键词
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How do multiple attributes of a product jointly determine a seller's disclosure incentives? I model a monopolist whose product is characterized by vertical quality and a horizontal attribute. Contrary to the unraveling theory, the monopolist in equilibrium does not always choose disclosure. When the product's quality is common knowledge, a monopolist with higher quality is less likely to disclose the horizontal attribute. Notably, the monopolist may choose nondisclosure when his product has the highest quality. The results shed light on governments' mandatory disclosure policies and companies' marketing strategies.
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