期刊
TOPICS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
卷 3, 期 2, 页码 425-437出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x
关键词
Explanation; Dynamical systems; Representation; Mechanism; Philosophy of science
资金
- NICHD NIH HHS [HD-01994] Funding Source: Medline
- Division Of Behavioral and Cognitive Sci
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [0925373] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel's (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science.
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