4.2 Article

Submodular Secretary Problem and Extensions

期刊

ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ALGORITHMS
卷 9, 期 4, 页码 -

出版社

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY
DOI: 10.1145/2500121

关键词

Stopping theory; secretary problem; online algorithms; competitive algorithms; submodular; matroid constraint; knapsack constraint

资金

  1. NSF CAREER award [1053605]
  2. ONR YIP award [N000141110662]
  3. DARPA/AFOSR [FA9550-12-1-0423]
  4. University of Maryland Research and Scholarship Award (RASA)
  5. NSF [CCF-1161626]
  6. Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr
  7. Division of Computing and Communication Foundations [1053605] Funding Source: National Science Foundation

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Online auction is the essence of many modern markets, particularly networked markets, in which information about goods, agents, and outcomes is revealed over a period of time, and the agents must make irrevocable decisions without knowing future information. Optimal stopping theory, especially the classic secretary problem, is a powerful tool for analyzing such online scenarios which generally require optimizing an objective function over the input. The secretary problem and its generalization the multiple-choice secretary problem were under a thorough study in the literature. In this article, we consider a very general setting of the latter problem called the submodular secretary problem, in which the goal is to select k secretaries so as to maximize the expectation of a (not necessarily monotone) submodular function which defines efficiency of the selected secretarial group based on their overlapping skills. We present the first constant-competitive algorithm for this case. In a more general setting in which selected secretaries should form an independent (feasible) set in each of l given matroids as well, we obtain an O(l log(2) r)-competitive algorithm generalizing several previous results, where r is the maximum rank of the matroids. Another generalization is to consider l knapsack constraints (i.e., a knapsack constraint assigns a nonnegative cost to each secretary, and requires that the total cost of all the secretaries employed be no more than a budget value) instead of the matroid constraints, for which we present an O(l)-competitive algorithm. In a sharp contrast, we show for a more general setting of subadditive secretary problem, there is no (o) over tilde(root n)-competitive algorithm and thus submodular functions are the most general functions to consider for constant-competitiveness in our setting. We complement this result by giving a matching O(root n)-competitive algorithm for the subadditive case. At the end, we consider some special cases of our general setting as well.

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