期刊
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
卷 101, 期 6, 页码 2562-2589出版社
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2562
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资金
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences [0962492] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- Division Of Behavioral and Cognitive Sci
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [1111019] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)
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