期刊
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
卷 14, 期 6, 页码 1406-1416出版社
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01085.x
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资金
- NCI NIH HHS [CM-5-P40RR003640-13] Funding Source: Medline
- NCRR NIH HHS [P40 RR003640] Funding Source: Medline
- NIMH NIH HHS [R01 MH089484, 1R01MH-089484] Funding Source: Medline
The capacity to reason about the false beliefs of others is classically considered the benchmark for a fully fledged understanding of the mental lives of others. Although much is known about the developmental origins of our understanding of others beliefs, we still know much less about the evolutionary origins of this capacity. Here, we examine whether non-human primates specifically, rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) share this developmental achievement. We presented macaques with a looking-time measure of false belief understanding, one that had recently been developed for use with 15-month-old human infants. Like human infants, monkeys look longer when a human experimenter fails to search in the correct location when she has accurate knowledge. In contrast to infants, however, monkeys appear to make no prediction about how a human experimenter will act when she has a false belief. Across three studies, macaques pattern of results is consistent with the view that monkeys can represent the knowledge and ignorance of others, but not their beliefs. The capacity to represent beliefs may therefore be a unique hallmark of human cognition.
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