期刊
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY
卷 13, 期 6, 页码 935-955出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01526.x
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We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable sets (Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch 2009). We first show that under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. We then investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks
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