期刊
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
卷 95, 期 11-12, 页码 1358-1372出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.015
关键词
Local government; Private government; Collective action
类别
This paper carries out a micro-level analysis of collective goods provision by focusing on the formation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). The paper's theoretical and empirical analysis is unusually complete in that it considers the entire process of collective action, including participation in initial organization, voting, and ultimate impact on property values. BID benefits are shown to be highly uneven, and BID formation is not a Pareto improvement Furthermore, large anchor participants benefit disproportionately, and are crucial for the viability of the institution, consistent with Olson (1965). These results, while demonstrated in a particular setting, apply to collective action more generally. Whenever a market failure leaves room for a collective response, the presence of anchor participants encourages collective action, and the action - even though in a sense voluntary - has uneven benefits. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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