期刊
SUSTAINABILITY
卷 10, 期 5, 页码 -出版社
MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/su10051402
关键词
patent protection; reward-penalty policy; remanufacturing; closed-loop supply chain (CLSC); waste collection
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71371169, 71172182, 71302122]
- Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang [LY18G020020]
- Soft Science Foundation of Ningbo [2016A10059]
There is increasing academic and pragmatic interest in leveraging patent rights to invigorate remanufacturing for waste products under governmental interventions via regulations and reward-penalty instruments. In practice, many original manufacturers that are possessed with intellectual property rights allow third-party remanufacturers to implement reproducing operations through authorization and charging licensing fees. The general purpose of this paper is to explore favorable strategies for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system of waste product collection and remanufacturing, in the context of either manufacturer-remanufacturing or remanufacturer-remanufacturing. To achieve such an objective, game theory is adopted to establish models of three collection and remanufacturing modes among channel members involving a manufacturer, a seller, and a remanufacturer. In so doing, the results show that a government's allocations of elementary remanufacturing ratio and the unit amount of reward-penalty count significantly in CLSC operations, especially for the manufacturer, who acts as the leader in the system and makes mode selections.
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