4.4 Article

Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting

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JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
卷 53, 期 1-2, 页码 311-329

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ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.09.001

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Executive overconfidence; Fraud; Earnings management; Corporate governance

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A detailed analysis of 49 firms subject to AAERs suggests that approximately one-quarter of the misstatements meet the legal standards of intent. In the remaining three quarters, the initial misstatement reflects an optimistic bias that is not necessarily intentional. Because of the bias, however, in subsequent periods these firms are more likely to be in a position in which they are compelled to intentionally misstate earnings. Overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional misstatements. Evidence from a high-tech sample and a larger and more general sample support the overconfidence explanation for this path to misstatements and AAERs. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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