期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID
卷 10, 期 4, 页码 3585-3595出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2018.2832544
关键词
DC microgrid; denial-of-service attack; distributed control; false-data injection attack; signal-temporal logic
资金
- Department of Defense [W91NF-16-1-0534]
- National Science Foundation [ECCS-1405173]
- Office of Naval Research [N00014-17-1-2239]
- Defense University Research Instrumentation Program [N00014-16-1-3180]
- NSF [CNS 1464311, CNS 1713253, SHF 1527398, SHF 1736323]
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research [FA9550-15-1-0258, FA9550-16-1-0246, FA9550-18-1-0122]
- Division Of Computer and Network Systems
- Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr [1713253] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Emerging converter-dominated dc microgrids employ distributed cooperative control strategies and communication network. Since there is no central entity to monitor and assess the global cyber scenario, microgrids employing distributed control are prone to cyber attacks. This work presents signal temporal logic (STL) detection of two major types of cyber attacks, namely false-data injection attacks and denial-of-service attacks. Such cyber attacks can compromise voltage regulation and load sharing in dc microgrids. STL is a formalism to monitor the output voltages and currents of dc microgrids against the defined specifications, such as operational bounds, over time. Besides detection, the proposed approach also quantifies the attack impact. Moreover, it can he effectively employed for a complex dc microgrid without prior knowledge of its dynamics. This detection technique is successfully demonstrated using a physical microgrid setup or in a hardware-in-the-loop environment, where various attacks are formalized, detected, and quantified.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据