4.2 Article

The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions in oligopolistic industries

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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL
卷 36, 期 4, 页码 585-609

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ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.001

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Anticompetitive effect; Industry structure; Real options; Takeovers

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This paper embeds an oligopolistic industry structure in a real options framework in which synergy gains of horizontal mergers arise endogenously and vary stochastically over time. We find that (i) mergers are more likely in more concentrated industries; (ii) mergers are more likely in industries that are more exposed to industry-wide shocks; (iii) returns to merger and rival firms arising from restructuring are higher in more concentrated industries; (iv) increased industry competition delays the timing of mergers; (v) in sufficiently concentrated industries, bidder competition induces a bid premium that declines with product market competition; and (vi) mergers are more likely and yield larger returns in industries with higher dispersion in firm size. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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