期刊
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS
卷 41, 期 2, 页码 216-237出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-011-9162-3
关键词
FDI; Emission standard; Race to the bottom; Regulatory chill
类别
Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows accompanied with globalization have raised the concern of a race to the bottom phenomenon in environmental protection. This is because footloose investors of dirty industries tend to relocate to pollution havens of the developing world. However when pollutant is transboundary (as in the case of greenhouse gases), the source country's incentive to relocate and the recipient country's willingness to host such industries are not straightforward. This article studies the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation using a North-South market share game model in a two-country setting, when pollution is transboundary. Contrary to the pollution haven hypothesis, our model shows that if market sizes of the two countries are small, FDI will raise the emission standard of the host country, resulting in a race-to-the-top phenomenon; but if market sizes are large enough, FDI will not change the emission standard of the South (from its laxest form), a finding that is consistent with the regulatory chill argument. Equilibrium FDI is contingent on the fixed cost of FDI, as the traditional proximity-concentration tradeoff theory predicts.
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