期刊
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
卷 102, 期 2, 页码 720-749出版社
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.720
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资金
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [0951462] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were lenient in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were forgiving in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)
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