期刊
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
卷 40, 期 6, 页码 1213-1223出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12.007
关键词
payments for environmental services; cost-effectiveness; auction; land use; Malawi; Indonesia
Payments for environmental services programs use direct incentives to improve the environmental impacts of private land use decisions. An auction offers an approach to efficiently allocating contracts among least-cost landholders, which can improve the overall cost-effectiveness of the approach. However, experiences with auctions in developing country settings are limited. We compare the results of two case studies that use auctions to allocate payments for environmental service contracts in Indonesia and Malawi. While the settings and the contracts differ, regularities in auction design allow comparisons and general lessons about the application of auctions to payments for environmental services programs. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据