期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 158, 期 1, 页码 31-41出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9665-2
关键词
Bare particulars; Thin particulars; Substratum; Bundle theory
类别
There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory-bare particularism-is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic-and, I shall argue, false-crowding consequence.
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