期刊
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
卷 93, 期 2, 页码 197-227出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01423.x
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In this article I defend innocuousism - a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, sometimes dying may be less good than living, but it is never bad to die.
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