期刊
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
卷 56, 期 6, 页码 1276-1288出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.05.005
关键词
Social networks; Learning; Social influence; Persuasion bias; Bounded rationality
类别
This paper presents an experimental investigation of persuasion bias, a form of bounded rationality whereby agents communicating through a social network are unable to account for repetitions in the information they receive. We find that, after repeated communication within a social network, social influence depends not only on being listened to by many others, but also on listening to many others. We show that persuasion bias can be viewed as an extreme case of a generalized boundedly rational updating rule in which agents receive more or less attention depending on how many other agents they listen to. The results indicate that behavior in the experiment is consistent with an updating rule according to which agents' social influence is proportional to their indegree. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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