期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS
卷 15, 期 3, 页码 255-275出版社
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2012.706822
关键词
moral judgement; moral reasoning; moral intuition; moral rationalism; Jonathan Haidt
类别
Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance - in short: education - of our moral intuitions.
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