期刊
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL
卷 113, 期 -, 页码 24-33出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2018.05.002
关键词
Electric vehicles; Evolutionary dynamics; Diffusion; Policy; Game theory
类别
资金
- Israeli Ministry of Energy and Water [212-11-012]
- Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia - FCT/MCTES [SFRH/BD/94736/2013, SFRH/BPD/1169337/2016, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014]
- CBMA
- INESC-ID
- CICS.NOVA [UID/BIA/04050/2013, UID/CEC/50021/2013, UID/SOC/04647/2013]
Electric vehicles (EVs) are a viable alternative to internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, with the potential to alleviate the negative externalities stemming from the present ICE-based transportation sector. Notwithstanding, the current prevalence of ICE creates a lock-in state that averts the adoption of alternative and environmental friendly technologies, bringing forth a social dilemma. Here we investigate the feasibility of escaping the present lock-in state by studying possible incentive mechanisms involving, simultaneously, governments (public), companies (private) and consumers (civil). Resorting to evolutionary game theory (EGT), we develop a theoretical model grounded on the strategic interactions between players from the different sectors, whose co-evolving choices influence (and are influenced by) different policies and social incentives. Our findings suggest that i) public regulation is necessary but not sufficient for guaranteeing full EV adoption; ii) public-civil synergies are essential; iii) demand for EVs preceding supply is most efficient, providing companies with the needed incentives to counterweigh infrastructure investments; and iv) full adoption of EVs requires coordination between the three sectors to emerge, particularly when changes are initiated by the public sector. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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