期刊
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS
卷 34, 期 4, 页码 431-441出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.04.003
关键词
Asymmetric information; Compliance; Enforcement policy; Environmental policy; Interest groups; Lobbying; Political economy
The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement policy increases the polluters' expected financial burden, and induces them to exert greater political pressure on reducing the stringency of environmental regulation. thereby resulting in a larger amount of pollution emissions. We also show that tightening the enforcement policy can reduce efficiency. We highlight the possibility of policymaking being misguided due to overlooking the political effect of enforcement policy. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据