期刊
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY
卷 4, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
FRONTIERS MEDIA SA
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00023
关键词
agency; causality; intention; mental-state attribution; intentional binding; consciousness; fMRI; social perception
资金
- Medical Research Council [G0001354] Funding Source: Medline
- Wellcome Trust [095692] Funding Source: Medline
- Medical Research Council [G0001354B, G1000183B, G0001354] Funding Source: researchfish
Recent research on human agency suggests that intentional causation is associated with a subjective compression in the temporal interval between actions and their effects. That is, intentional movements and their causal effects are perceived as closer together in time than equivalent unintentional movements and their causal effects. This so-called intentional binding effect is consistently found for one's own self-generated actions. It has also been suggested that intentional binding occurs when observing intentional movements of others. However, this evidence is undermined by limitations of the paradigm used. In the current study we aimed to overcome these limitations using a more rigorous design in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural underpinnings of intentional binding of observed movements. In particular, we aimed to identify brain areas sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causality attributed to the observed action. Our behavioral results confirmed the occurrence of intentional binding for observed movements using this more rigorous paradigm. Our fMRI results highlighted a collection of brain regions whose activity was sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causation. Intriguingly, these brain regions have previously been implicated in the sense of agency over one's own movements. We discuss the implications of these results for intentional binding specifically, and the sense of agency more generally.
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