期刊
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
卷 51, 期 1, 页码 1-30出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00467.x
关键词
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Overconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism. We further find that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect. Our findings add to the growing literature on overconfidence and complement the findings by Schrand and Zechman [2011] that overconfidence affects financial reporting behavior.
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