期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 77, 期 1, 页码 181-213出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002
关键词
Gender; Menstrual cycle; Contraceptive pills; Auction; Experiment
类别
资金
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [0962492] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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