期刊
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE
卷 46, 期 2, 页码 705-724出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/caje.12029
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- Economic and Social Research Council [ES/H02123X/1] Funding Source: researchfish
- ESRC [ES/H02123X/1] Funding Source: UKRI
This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re-election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.
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